Her opinion stated that she would have found that the Idaho and Nevada laws unlawfully discriminated on the basis of sex as, among other reasons, "the social exclusion and state discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people reflects, in large part, disapproval of their nonconformity with gender-based expectations." , No.
Chief Judge Wood, writing for the majority, first relied on the "comparative method" of analysis, reasoning that "Hively alleges that if she had been a man married to a woman .
Although in this case the defendant asserted that it fired the plaintiff because of potential lawsuits if she used the women's restroom, the record showed that the plaintiff's office had only single-use unisex restrooms, and therefore there was no evidence that the defendant was actually motivated by litigation concerns about restroom use. Plaintiff, who "was a male-to-female transsexual who was living as a male while on duty but often lived as a woman off duty [and] had a reputation throughout the police department as a homosexual, bisexual or cross-dresser," alleged he was demoted because of his failure to conform to sex stereotypes. The plaintiff alleged that he was suspended based on sex after he began to express a more feminine appearance and notified his employer that he would eventually undergo a complete physical transformation from male to female.
"The nature of the discrimination is the same; it may differ in degree but not in kind." The court further concluded that discrimination based on sex stereotypes is subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, and government termination of a transgender person for his or her gender nonconformity is unconstitutional sex discrimination.
must extend to [sex-based] discrimination of any kind that meets the statutory requirements." , 490 U. Price Waterhouse had denied Ann Hopkins a promotion in part because other partners at the firm felt that she did not act as woman should act. context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender." , 2016 WL 158820 (11th Cir. The employer asserted that the plaintiff was fired for sleeping on the job and noted that other employees had been fired for the same offense. § 1983 alleging unlawful discrimination based on sex in violation of the Equal Protection Clause when she was terminated from her position with the Georgia General Assembly.
The Supreme Court recognized that employment discrimination based on sex stereotypes (e.g., assumptions and/or expectations about how persons of a certain sex should dress, behave, etc.) is unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII. Reversing summary judgment for the employer on the plaintiff's claim that she was terminated from her job as an auto mechanic because she is transgender, the court remanded the case for trial because there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to whether gender bias was a motivating factor.